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On The Symbiosis of Law and Truth in Christian Theology: 
Reconciling Universal and Particular through the Pauline Law of 
Love 
Alex Deagon1 
 
 
Synopsis 
 
This article argues that the secular liberal and positivist foundations of the modern Western 
legal system render it violent.  In particular, the liberal exclusion of faith and subjectivity in 
favour of abstract and universal reason in conjunction with its privileging of individual 
autonomy at the expense of the community leads to alienation of the individual from the 
community.  Similarly, the positivist exclusion of faith and theology from law with its 
enforced conformity to the posited law also results in this violence of alienation.  In response, 
this article proposes a new foundation for law, a natural law based in the truth of Trinitarian 
theology articulated by John Milbank.  In the Trinity, the members exist as a perfect unity in 
diversity, providing a model for the reconciliation of the legal individual and community: the 
law of love.  Through the law of love as the basic norm, individuals love their neighbours as 
themselves, reconciling the particular and the universal, and providing a community of peace 
rather than violence. 
 
 
                                                            
1 Sessional Lecturer and PhD Candidate, Griffith Law School, Griffith University. 
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Alienation and Reconciliation: (Particular?) Law as Violence, and Pursuing 
(Universal?) Peace 
 
Law, at its most basic and insofar as it can be simply defined, can be considered for the 
purposes of this article as a principle or set of principles which govern relationships within a 
community.2  Within a modern Western legal system (or what could be largely considered a 
liberal, positivist system), law aims to achieve justice, promote freedom, uphold the rule of 
law and protect security.3  However, despite the aspirational language, this article argues that 
such a system is undesirable and problematic – ultimately, even violent.   
 
For in this conception of the legal system, there exists a fundamental violence (of 
alienation) between the individual or particular, and the community or universal.4  At one 
level, there is a focus on totalisation, where a person is submitted to a general principle such 
as the ‘rule of law’ which forms their identity and subsumes difference.  Upholding this ‘rule 
of law’, which claims that the law is objective, applies equally to everyone, and is the 
authority for and subjectivates the society, arguably leads to alienation where personal 
subjectivity is irrelevant.5  Paradoxically, this can also work at the opposite level, for in 
liberalism’s focus on rights and autonomy, there is often a privileging of the individual which 
alienates them from the good of the community.  There is also a similar and related alienation 
and tension between the individual and the community in positivist jurisprudence, which 
                                                            
2 As will become apparent, the advantage of a definition like this lies in its flexibility (notwithstanding the issue 
of ambiguity, which is bypassed here – the definition of law itself could perhaps be considered a microcosm of 
the universal/particular problem which this article addresses).  Such could include various forms of liberalism, 
positivism, natural law, and even the Pauline law of love. 
3 Wacks (2008), p 1. 
4 Here violence is taken to mean rupture or split, an alienation between the individual and the community.  Of 
course, this may manifest itself in the more traditional forms of violence, as alluded to later in the article. 
5 Bloechl (2013). 
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alienates the individual through enforcing conformity and obedience to privilege and protect 
the community.  This article argues that the violence of alienation results from the secular 
nature of liberalism and positivism, which rejects the subjective nature of faith in favour of a 
universal, totalising reason which is indifferent to the individual. 
 
However, through the return of a theological natural law, or the paradigm of the law 
of loving your neighbour as yourself which is the unity and diversity in the community of the 
Trinity, a model is provided from Christian theology which reconciles faith and reason and 
allows a harmonious relationship between the individual and the society.  This avoids 
totalisation and alienation of the individual, and provides for a peaceful legal community 
which privileges one’s neighbour as an individual and therefore strengthens the community 
as a composite of unique individuals.6 
 
The article initially overviews liberalism and positivism, indicating its secular nature 
and cataloguing its consequently alienating violence in the context of the perennial one and 
many problem.  It then proposes that the solution lies in a return to natural law through faith 
and the theological, which will reconcile the individual and the community and establish 
social peace.  To this end, the article considers the ways in which classical Christian 
theologians such as Saint Augustine of Hippo and Saint Thomas Aquinas articulate the fact 
that faith is inherently reasonable, and illustrates this generally in relation to law through the 
concepts of natural law outlined by Aquinas.  However, a natural law capable of resolving 
intersubjective alienation must go beyond Aquinas, for on Aquinas’ view of God’s simplicity 
and his focus on communal good, this violence of alienation between the individual and the 
                                                            
6 See e.g. Gunton (1992), pp 210-222. 
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community remains.  Thus, the article argues that it is at this point where the properly 
Trinitarian theology of John Milbank is able to redress the limitations of Aquinas and form 
the basis for a natural law which reconciles the individual and the community in the legal 
context. 
 
Following Milbank, this article proposes that the key to restoring reason to faith and 
providing a law which will consequently resolve the problem of totalisation and 
intersubjective alienation is, against the secular, Incarnational paradox incorporating Christ’s 
life, death and resurrection, which together assume and instantiate the Pauline law of love: 
that one should love their neighbours as themselves.7  For in Christ the incarnate God, there 
occurs the meeting of infinite and finite, and this is the absolute truth which recovers reason 
and unites it to faith.  In Christ therefore peace is given, since the resurrection and faith in the 
resurrection can save humanity and produce perfect and infinite peace – truth and law 
combined, individual and community reconciled.  According to this reading of Paul, it is the 
peaceful uniting of humanity through the resurrection which institutes the law of love, and 
makes possible codified law grounded in the truth of loving neighbour as self.  It follows that 
law and truth are symbiotic in Christian theology.   
 
These propositions are further contextualised and refined through considering the 
position of Gillian Rose in terms of the idea of necessary violence in law and the relationship 
between social norms and social practice.  Finally, the article will conclude with some 
                                                            
7 Importantly, this does not entail that dialogue regarding the interpretation of Christian jurisprudence and 
theology is simply restricted to believers.  One can of course approach these from a personal perspective of 
secularism, but it is a distortion to reject or ignore fundamental Christian doctrines whilst simultaneously 
claiming to elucidate the ‘true’ teaching of Christianity.  In short, one can accurately and consistently explain 
and analyse Christian theology and its implications without personally believing it, and this is especially the 
case with a controversial teaching such as the Resurrection. 
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considerations regarding the content of the Pauline law of loving the neighbour, and how it 
may counter-intuitively be the catalyst for the regeneration (rebirth?) of law through the 
Grundnorm of Hans Kelsen. 
 
Liberalism, Positivism and the Secular: A Law of Violence 
 
Liberal theories of law assume certainty and stability in legal doctrine and a uniform society 
on which this doctrine acts.  On this view, law is separate from its cultural and political 
setting because it operates on the ‘basis of abstract rationality and is thus universally 
applicable’.8  The law is above politics and resolves disputes between equal members of 
society, and accordingly involves the application of logical principles and rational argument, 
rather than power and coercion.  This is an expression of universal rationality which can 
objectively demonstrate the superiority of certain values through reason, though such 
contentions and assumptions have been challenged by numerous critical schools.9  In this 
sense, liberalism can also be viewed as the effective secularisation of law, for it rejects faith 
and the theological in law through abstracting law and legal process from culture and the 
individual, proclaiming objectivity and placing law within the context of a universal 
rationality and reason – or what may be termed a ‘secular’ reason, without faith. 
 
In terms of the rule of law, many commentators tend to assume the formal aspects of 
the rule of law (such as equality before the law and the autonomy of law) will necessarily 
result in ‘just’ outcomes, whether formal or substantive.  However, what has instead been 
                                                            
8 Simpson and Charlesworth (1995), p 86. 
9 Simpson and Charlesworth (1995), pp 86-87. 
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found is that the proclamation of the rule of law tends to produce violence as a result of norm 
creation, for the simple reason that law is not in fact independent of culture.10  Thus, 
abstractly and universally imposing a rigid ‘rule of law’ on diverse societies (not to mention 
the diversities existing within diverse societies) presents serious problems.  The rule of law, 
despite (or perhaps because of) its claims to independence and objectivity, may then 
ideologically become an institutional construct which can be used for violent purposes.  In 
particular, it can be seen as a mechanism for constructing and legitimising plunder through 
allowing stronger actors to victimise weaker ones under the façade of ‘equality’, and also as a 
tool for violating the spirit of particular legal obligations.  In this sense, the rule of law can be 
used to embrace brute violence.11  Hence, it could be seen that the privileging of the rule of 
law as culturally independent excludes faith and subjectivity, and instead alienates different 
actors in different cultural contexts (by ideologically constructing disparate power relations 
as mentioned above), providing mechanisms for domination and the violation of law’s spirit.  
Fundamentally then, liberal theories of law and their associated secularisation can be seen as 
producing violence. 
 
This turn to violence (and its associated secularisation of law) is exemplified in the 
legal theory of positivism.  In particular, the theological basis for law was rejected by the 
foundational positivism of John Austin, who explicitly excludes God from law in that 
according to him, the laws of God are not within the ‘province of jurisprudence’.12   For 
Austin, the province of jurisprudence (i.e. the definition of law) is positive law or law that is 
posited by political superiors to political inferiors (law by position).  In other words, it is a 
rule laid down by an intelligent being by an intelligent being having power over him.  The 
                                                            
10 Brooks (2003), pp 2283-2286. 
11 Mattei and Nader (2008), pp ix-5. 
12 Austin (1998), pp 8-9. 
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political superior with power is termed the sovereign.13  Every law, properly so-called, is a 
species of command.  Command is distinguished from wish or desire by the fact that the 
party issuing the command has the power to inflict evil or pain in the event that the command 
is not obeyed.  This evil incurred through disobedience is called sanction, or enforcement of 
obedience.14  Therefore, law according to Austin may be defined as a command from a 
sovereign enforced by sanction.   
 
The language utilised by Austin in the context of rejecting theology invokes violence.  
The very term ‘positivism’ itself connotes the violent positing of law, a use of force to 
establish and preserve the law, as well as to compel obedience to it.  Indeed, integral to 
Austin’s very definition of law is this notion of sanction for disobedience, namely that 
obedience by the legal subject is (en)forced (coerced?) through inflicted evil and pain.  Thus, 
Austin’s definition of law entails an essential ontology of violence.  In his critique of Austin, 
HLA Hart (a positivist himself) agrees, arguing that Austin’s law of the sovereign giving 
coercive orders (commands enforced by sanction) is nothing more than the law of the 
gunman: ‘A orders B to hand over his money and threatens to shoot him if he does not 
comply’.15  Not only does this strengthen the contention that Austinian positivism is 
intrinsically violent, but for Hart it also demonstrates the failure of Austin to give a proper 
account of the nature of the legal system as a series of rules producing obligations.16  In 
particular, Hart states that two types of legal rules exist.  The first or primary rules are those 
rules under which people are required to do or abstain from certain actions.  The secondary 
rules introduce, extinguish and modify primary rules, and determine the nature of their 
                                                            
13 Austin (1998), pp 8-9. 
14 Austin (1998), pp 11-12. 
15 Hart (1994), p 82. 
16 Hart (1994), pp 79-80. 
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operation.  The most important of these is the secondary rule of recognition, which identifies 
and gives validity to the primary rules of obligation.17  This obligation stems from what Hart 
terms the internal aspect of rules, where the citizen as part of the society (internal to it) is 
under some duty or obligation to obey the rule through something like habit or social pressure 
to conform, as opposed to the external point of view which merely views rules as predictors 
of human behaviour, with the external observer experiencing none of the obligation to 
comply.18 
 
However, William MacNeil argues that Hart never really resolves the latent violence 
in the command theory of Austinian positivism – instead of replacing this violence with rules, 
Hart displaces the violence to the rule system itself, especially to the rule of recognition.19  
MacNeil also notes Hart’s apparent indifference to the violence of law, symptomatic of his 
anxiety (as a positivist) to avoid invoking moral concepts of good.20  Even Hart’s rule of 
recognition imbibes violence due to its circular nature (the officials recognise the rule that 
recognises them as officials), for it proclaims certainty when there is only ambiguity, and 
papers over what Jacques Derrida terms the ‘mystical foundation of law’ – that on this view, 
there is no foundation – only coercion.21  Indeed, Hart ultimately appeals to law being 
recognised as that which parliament enacts, which indicates no fundamental difference with 
Austin’s theory.22  Although, this is not quite so – MacNeil identifies that there is one 
devastating difference.  Due to the internal aspect of Hart’s rule system, the Austinian 
violence displaced there is no longer external, but internal.  In other words, the gunman is 
now inside your head, so to speak.  Thus, MacNeil appeals for the return of Austinian 
                                                            
17 Hart (1994), pp 80-81, 100. 
18 Hart (1994), pp 86-89. 
19 MacNeil (2007), p 44. 
20 MacNeil (2007), pp 49-50. 
21 Derrida (1989), p 10. 
22 MacNeil (2007), pp 53-54. 
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positivism and the rejection of Hartian positivism, for at least Austin leaves room for inner 
thought and reflection, while Hart gives us a violence ‘(fascism) of the mind’.23 
 
However, as we have seen, if we wish to move beyond a law which enforces 
obedience through the violence of alienation, returning to John Austin is not an option.  
Indeed, any kind of secular foundation which alienates the individual from the community 
appears to be problematic.  To further illustrate the situation more generally, this issue of 
violence between individual and community is perennial in philosophy, for resolution of the 
one and the many is, in one sense, the very beginning of philosophy.  Its contribution is most 
clearly set forth in the famed disagreement between Heraclitus and Parmenides.  Heraclitus is 
the philosopher of plurality and motion – everything is becoming, the many are prior to the 
one, and there is no stability in nature.  By contrast, Parmenides argued that nature is uniform 
and unchanging, pure being with no becoming – the many do not really exist, but everything 
is the One.24 
 
Aristotle joined the dialogue on the contrast between these positions, and articulated 
why this is a question which requires some form of resolution or reconciliation.  In Aristotle’s 
conception, particulars are contrasted with universals, but in a variety of ways.  In some 
contexts it is a distinction between types in a class (particular is a specific type, and universal 
is a general type), and in others a distinction between types and individuals (particulars are 
individuals, and universals are types), and Devereux argues that Aristotle ultimately has in 
mind some combination of these two distinctions when he employs these terms.25  According 
                                                            
23 MacNeil (2007), pp 58-60. 
24 Gunton (1992), pp 17-18. 
25 Devereux (1986), pp 485, 491. 
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to Devereux, Aristotle used a medical analogy to illustrate why the distinction between 
universal and particular is in fact a ‘problem’: ‘… the general universal statement is 
inadequate insofar as it is indeterminate with respect to particular situations, while the more 
specific universal statement, though more determinate, is nevertheless liable to mislead’.26  In 
other words, the universal fails to take account of the specific situation vis-à-vis its 
ambiguous universality, while the more specified or particularised universal (or the 
‘particular’) cannot be applied universally.  Hence, the problem of the one and the many: the 
universal alienates the particular, and the particular castrates the universal.  It is this issue, 
violently manifested in legal ontology through totalisation and alienation of the individual, 
which is the subject of this article and for which reconciliation is sought, one which will 
allow peace to flourish between legal individuals and the legal community.27 
 
A Return to Natural Law: Faith, Trinitarian Love and Social Peace 
 
Mather suggests that natural law theory may be useful to resolve some of the mentioned 
defects in liberalism, particularly in the sense of avoiding coercion and promoting a 
pluralistic conception of the good.  However, he notes that the problems of interpersonal 
conflict and deciding which forms of immoral conduct ought to be legally prohibited remain 
difficult to solve.28  In particular, this article argues that a fully theological natural law may 
be the path to a legal community based in peace rather than violence, where the individual 
and the community are reconciled (or there exists a ‘pluralistic concept of the good’) and 
interpersonal conflict is resolved through the notion of ‘the law of love’ – to love your 
                                                            
26 Devereux (1986), p 496. 
27 C.f. the problem Aristotle identifies with law in this context in Devereux (1986), pp 500-502. 
28 Mather (2001), pp 374-375.  This article will not address the latter problem, but it will attempt to address the 
former. 
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neighbour as yourself.  Indeed, since God in Christian theology is both one and many in the 
Trinity, so social ontology is not relegated to the necessary violence of one or many, but 
rather as a model of the Trinity society may peacefully exist as both individual and 
community.29  For as Gunton observes, modern society (including legal society) either 
focuses on the many, which results in arbitrariness and irrationality, or on the one, which 
does violence to individuals by denying their differences.30  Hence the modern society, and 
indeed the modern legal society, requires a foundational system which promotes both one and 
many, individual and community – and it is proposed that this is uniquely found in the 
Pauline law of love, which produces peace rather than violence. 
 
This theological notion of peace being the reconciliation of individual and community 
and violence being the alienation of individual and community has its foundation in 
Augustine, and has been framed more recently by John Milbank.  According to Augustine the 
heavenly peace is unique in that it 
 …is so truly peaceful that it should be regarded as the only peace deserving the name, at least 
in respect of the rational creation; for this peace is the perfectly ordered and completely 
harmonious fellowship in the enjoyment of God, and each other in God.  When we arrive at 
that state of peace, there will be no longer a life that ends in death, but a life that is life in sure 
and sober truth.31   
 
The key here is ‘perfectly ordered and completely harmonious fellowship’ in the 
enjoyment of God and each other, which leads not to death or violence, but rather to peace 
and the good.  This problem of whether there can be a harmonious human order is central – 
whether one can assign to their respective tasks and places many different activities, desires, 
                                                            
29 C.f. Gunton (1992), pp 18-19. 
30 Gunton (1992), pp 41-46. 
31 Augustine (2003), p 878. 
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and social formations.  If this is not possible, then ‘only an “effective” peace is possible, a 
“secular” peace of temporarily suspended violence or regulated competition’.32 Augustine 
therefore argued that the Romans had no real virtue because they knew no real peace, either 
at the level of practice or at the level of mythical or ontological conception.  The Roman 
heroic virtue only came as a result of war, and the ‘peace’ is a peace of suspended warfare 
caused by war – and thus, was no real peace at all.  This has its modern analogue in 
positivism, which really promotes a ‘peace’ of suspended violence where obedience to law is 
compelled by either physical or mental force, and tends to inhibit human flourishing by 
alienating the individual from the community.  This is similarly the case in regard to liberal 
conceptions of autonomy and property rights, where relations between legal persons are just 
regulated competition. By contrast, Christian peace has ontological priority over conflict, for 
it is what is most real, most secure and most guarantees human life.33   
 
Hence, violence at its essence is the denial of Being as infinite plenitude and as 
harmonious ordering of difference.34  In addition, Christianity construes virtue as that which 
aims towards and is possible within a fundamental condition of peace, a living together of 
different people in mutual agreement which is true peace, as opposed to the spurious pax 
Romana (Roman peace) of suspended warfare and secular ‘heroic’ virtues which are the 
result of warfare.35  Peace itself therefore also is beyond virtue because peace is the final end 
and condition in which virtue can flourish, the culmination of Being itself – or, as may be 
recalled, the harmonious ordering of difference.36  Thus, the new Christian imagination of 
                                                            
32 Milbank (1990), p 336. 
33 Milbank (1990), p 367. 
34 Milbank (1990), p 440. 
35 Milbank (1990), pp 332-333. 
36 Milbank (1990), p 367. 
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peace can be defined as ‘the reconciliation of virtue with difference’.37  In this sense, 
Christianity can rescue virtue from violent, agonistic difference, for the Christian multiple in 
the Trinity, the infinite flow of excessive charitable (love) difference, is in a much more 
genuine sense simultaneously unity, and manifests unity.38     
 
Conversely, liberalism and its proclamation of objective reason and the universal ‘rule 
of law’ tend to promote legal violence by excluding the individual nature of faith and 
promoting the secular.  However, it is not as if Christian faith is fideistic, where faith exists 
without reason (for this would tend to promote the individual at the expense of the ‘objective’ 
community).  Rather, just as in Christian theology the individual is reconciled to the 
particular, so faith is reconciled with reason.  Indeed, throughout the history of the Christian 
faith, its proponents have always seen themselves as simultaneously faithful and reasonable.  
This is the case across the full array of Christian religious and philosophical traditions, 
including such luminaries of the church as Saint Augustine, Saint Anselm, Saint Thomas 
Aquinas, and John Calvin.39  More recently, Alvin Plantinga and John Milbank have provided 
robust philosophical critiques of the claim that reason is inherently secular and consequently 
faith is by definition irrational or unreasonable.40  Consequently, the following discussion 
endeavours to suggest how Christian faith and reason are in fact unified, not violently 
divorced. 
 
                                                            
37 Milbank (1990), pp 332-333. 
38 Milbank (1990), pp 380-381. 
39 See below for discussion of Augustine and Aquinas.  See also Anselm (1999), p 88; Sokolowski (1982), pp 5-
6; Mascall (1963), pp 72-73; Calvin (2008), pp 42, 376-377; Calvin (1999), pp 143-145. 
40 See below for discussion of Milbank.  See also Plantinga (2000), pp 167-180, 244-264. 
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For example, Saint Augustine incorporated his understanding of the relationship 
between faith and reason into his concept of truth.  As a foundation, Augustine argued that 
according to the etymological definition of philosophy (‘love of wisdom’), since wisdom is 
identical with God and wisdom personified is God, lovers of God are the true philosophers, 
and come nearest to the truth.  Thus Augustine views truth as something progressively 
discovered by faith in conjunction with reason.41  It is by reason that humanity is separated 
from the brute animals, and is alone among the creation able to appreciate the Creator God.  
However, the fact that human reason has been corrupted by sin necessitates that reason must 
be initially purified by faith as humanity proceeds along the journey to truth, ultimately to 
God himself.42  Hence for Augustine, faith is required for the proper operation of reason, 
since trust in and love for Jesus Christ, the Word and Truth of God, is the foundation for true 
knowledge.  Otherwise, the powers of natural reason are prone to deception and error, rather 
than truth.43  Similarly, in addition to faith, reason is also necessary for the apprehension of 
truth.44  Rist therefore concludes by stating that: 
Since we are rational beings, it would be absurd to suppose that the prerequisite that faith 
precede reason is irrational – and we have now seen in what way it is eminently rational… it 
is loving faith which prepares the mind for reason to be able fully to perform its proper and 
most important functions.45   
 
In addition, Cushman argues that according to Augustine’s view, faith precedes 
reason, because unless one believes they will not understand, and that this position is rational.  
Consequently, ‘the faithful shall at last see God by the instrument of reason; but reason 
cannot attain the vision of God unguided by faith.’46  Augustine, however, does not advocate 
                                                            
41 Augustine (2003), p 298. 
42 Augustine (2003), p 430. 
43 Cushman (1950), pp 279, 282-283. 
44 Rist (2001), p 26, c.f. p 2. 
45 Rist (2001), p 38. 
46 Cushman (1950), pp 271, 273. 
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fideism: his is a faith seeking understanding.  Faith is required a priori due to the internally 
contradictory nature of a rationalistic, secular approach: ‘it cannot reach God because it does 
not want to have God.  It withholds commitment until it has sight; but it cannot achieve sight 
until it yields commitment.’47  Therefore, the purely secular rational approach underestimates 
the sinfulness of the human heart and is ultimately against true reason, according to 
Augustine.  Indeed, ‘faith and reason are required one of the other.  They are co-implicates; 
and it is error, in Augustine’s view, to divorce them.  Faith presupposes reason; reason 
urgently requires the correction of faith.’48  Faith in this sense is by its nature reasonable, for 
it enables the mind to properly exercise its capacity for reason. 
 
Aquinas, following Augustine, defines belief or faith to be thinking with assent.  To 
believe is an act of the intellect, and the formal object of faith is the first truth.49  Aquinas 
notes that the human intellect cannot know the truth of God naturally, but must be illuminated 
by his grace through the divine spark or light of participation.50  So faith is by definition in 
the intellect, inclines towards the truth, and is the most certain of the intellectual virtues.51  
This implies that this kind of faith is inherently reasonable, and moreover that the proper 
exercise of reason only occurs when enlightened by such faith. 
 
Indeed, Aquinas’ general theory of truth applies both to his understanding of the 
operation of reason and the operation of faith.  John Milbank argues that in Aquinas, reason 
and faith only represent different degrees of intensity of participation and divine 
                                                            
47 Cushman (1950), pp 284-285. 
48 Cushman (1950), p 294. 
49 Aquinas (1952) vol 1, pp 391-392. 
50 Aquinas (1952) vol 1, pp 54-55. 
51 Aquinas (1952) vol 1, pp 406, 409. 
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illumination.52  Furthermore, reason itself requires faith since it presupposes the operation of 
faith, while faith still demands discursive argumentation and is higher than reason only 
because it enjoys a deeper participation in the divine reason, which is pure intellect.53  Thus, 
Aquinas offers no support to those who claim there can be a philosophical approach to God 
independent of theology, or to those who demand confinement to Scripture without 
metaphysical reflection.  Rather, revelation supplements metaphysical reflection and enables 
the theoretical ascent to truth.  Ultimately, truth is restored only in the Incarnation, the 
hypostatic union.54   
 
John Milbank himself also aims to rescue reason from the domain of the secular, and 
restore it to its rightful position as fundamentally based in belief, or theology.  Indeed, he 
wishes to defend the idea that such a universal logic is necessarily theistic, endorsing belief in 
a transcendent deity.55  Milbank cites both Augustine and Aquinas as examples of theologians 
who attempted to find a common logic throughout Christian belief, ensuring that a Christian 
understanding of reason can be presented in continuity with a rational comprehension of the 
role of God’s revelation.56  Indeed, Aquinas understood good reason to be an attentive 
reception, via the mediation of the senses and discursive operations, of the divine light of the 
logos, in fundamental keeping with Augustine.  As such, good reason can only be such if it is 
based in faith.57  Therefore, Milbank argues that only theology can give us a true foundation 
on which knowledge, politics and ethics can stand.  Milbank states that his most important 
task is to transform the Greek philosophical logos through encounter with the theological 
                                                            
52 Milbank and Pickstock (2001), pp xiii-xiv. 
53 Milbank and Pickstock (2001), pp xiii-xiv. 
54 Milbank and Pickstock (2001), pp xiii-xiv. 
55 Milbank (2009a), p 111. 
56 Milbank (2009a), p 177. 
57 Milbank (2009b), pp 323-324. 
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logos, so that thought or reason itself becomes inescapably Christian, and, as such, ‘beyond 
secular reason’.58  Reason may consequently subscribe to belief in a transcendent source.59 
 
Milbank thus argues that if Christianity is persuasive then this persuasion should be 
inherent to the Christian logos itself, not to the mediation of secular reason.  Any positioning 
of theology by secular reason either idolatrously confines knowledge of God to immanent 
disciplines such as cosmology or psychology, or causes appreciation of the divine in terms 
‘beyond reason’, thus serving to confirm the myth of an autonomous secular realm of 
reason.60  Theology fully arrives in the incarnational event, the coming of Jesus Christ as the 
God-man, which is reconciled not through the foundation of secular reason, but through the 
unity of the Trinitarian relations.  For Milbank, God’s Incarnation saves us by opening up a 
way beyond the material realm into the beyond of the infinite life of God.61  Following from 
this, genuine transcendence is sustained only through incarnational paradox.62  Milbank 
rejects the modernist secular reason governing current discourse regarding the relationship of 
reason and faith (and indeed, law), returning reason to its inherent and proper basis in the 
theology of Incarnational paradox and theology to its inherent reason.  That is, Christian faith 
is inherently reasonable and reason and faith are compatible, for the very concept and 
capacity for reason lies in accepting the Christian doctrines by faith. 
 
Finally, arriving back where we started in terms of articulating a natural law which 
would reconcile the particular and the universal, this connection between faith, reason and 
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truth can be illustrated through Aquinas’ concept of natural law.  Aquinas defines law as an 
ordinance of reason for the common good, made and promulgated by the one who has care of 
the community.  Hence there is an eternal law or lex eterna, which is God’s law and which 
fulfils these criteria.63  Since the eternal law of God is a subset of the content of the divine 
intellect and is therefore unchangeable truth, and to some extent people know God and know 
truth, to this extent they know the eternal law.64  The divine law or lex divina allows man to 
participate more perfectly in the eternal law, and consists of the true revelation contained in 
Holy Scripture, the Old and New Testaments of the Bible.65  Those who do not have this law 
of revelation nevertheless do by nature those things which are of the law, and so know what 
is good and what is evil by conscience.  This is the natural law or lex natura, which humans 
apprehend through their possessing a share of the eternal reason, and so they are able to 
participate in the eternal law through reason.  Hence, the natural law is the rational creature’s 
participation in the eternal law.  Through human reason, the precepts of the natural law 
proceed to more particular determinations, which are called human or positive law.66  All 
human law or lex humana, as it accords with right reason, ultimately derives from the eternal 
law.  If a law deviates from right reason (implying it does not accord with the eternal law of 
God or immutable truth), it is necessarily unjust, and therefore lacks the necessary quality of 
law.67  Thus, Aquinas’ articulation of the natural law illustrates his previous description of the 
relationship between reason and faith – namely, that divinely illuminated human reason 
participates in the eternal law of God by faith, and if human law does not accord with this 
eternal law, it is necessarily against reason. 
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However, for this article’s broader purpose of reconciling the individual and the 
community through a theological natural law, it is not quite enough to simply return to 
Aquinas.  For Aquinas’ own ontology of God as well as his view of the natural law have 
some relevant shortcomings on this issue.  According to Aquinas, God is absolutely simple.  
This means he is the same as his essence or nature, and that his essence is his being.  In other 
words, God is not composed of diverse elements, but is one singular element: Absolute 
Unity.68  Hughes, in noting that God on Aquinas’ view is the simplest being, identical to all 
his parts, attributes, essence and existence, also notes the notion of God as Trinity where God 
is three persons and one nature, and one of these persons has a divine as well as human 
nature.  Thus, there is an incompatibility (or at least a conceptual difficulty) between 
Aquinas’ full doctrine of simplicity and the doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation.69  The 
fact that a reconciliation of the one and the many is based on a properly Trinitarian model of 
God (rather than a unitary model of God) therefore implies that Aquinas’ model may be 
insufficient for the task. 
 
Moreover, in terms of law specifically, Aquinas argues that the law is always directed 
to the common good.  Indeed, for Aquinas the focus and purpose of the law is achieving 
communal or universal happiness, and any law directed at the individual is not a law apart 
from when it regards the common good.  For Aquinas, what is important is not the part but 
the whole, for the ‘part is ordered to the whole as the imperfect to the perfect’.70  Indeed, the 
ethical and legal realm is the divinely anchored foundation of politics, and so legal justice as 
virtue must aim at nothing less than the common good.  In this sense, his theory is 
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generalised, and is aimed toward the universal rather than the particular.71  Dupre notes that 
there has been dispute between Thomists as to the extent that individual goods are 
incorporated into the common good, with many arguing that the notion of the common good 
alienates the individual.  Others have argued that for Aquinas, the common good as 
participation in the divine by faith in God is the ultimate good, and by its very nature 
individual.72  Indeed, with the rise of the social contractarians and the genesis of liberalism, 
society came to be viewed under individualist premises as a conglomerate of individuals, and 
this in turn resulted in the demise of the common good.73   
 
What this indicates is that Aquinas’ theology and natural law cannot be our solution 
for at least two reasons.  The first operates at the level of theological ontology; as we saw, 
Aquinas’ God is absolutely simple and consequently cannot provide a model for reconciling 
the individual and the community.  The second operates at the level of social ontology, and 
manifests itself in relation to Aquinas’ notion of law being directed towards the common 
good.  Some have understood this to mean that Aquinas privileges the community over the 
individual, as when for example a person is asked to obey an unjust law for the good of the 
community, forfeiting their difference as an individual.  Others have understood this to mean 
the good of participation in the divine, which is inherently individual and excludes the 
community.  There is no need to attempt a resolution of the point here, for it follows that 
regardless of which interpretation holds, there is in any case an alienation of the individual 
from the community, where one is privileged over the other and at the expense of the other.  
Thus, to articulate a theological natural law which promotes the peace of reconciling the one 
and the many, we must go beyond Aquinas to the fully Trinitarian theology of John Milbank, 
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alluded to earlier in this article.  Indeed, it is the law to love your neighbour as yourself, as 
modelled in the Trinitarian relations, which will ultimately prove to be the appropriate 
foundation for a legal community of peace – for in loving neighbour (community) as self 
(individual), the individual is reconciled to the community. 
 
The Truth of Incarnational Paradox: Uniting (Universal) Reason and (Particular) Faith 
 
However, the nature of this process here requires further development.  Milbank prefigures 
the solution by stating that the only alternative to (secular) pure reason and fideism is the 
return of a metaphysic which is able to mediate between faith and reason, a ’reasonable faith’ 
or theology.74  The key to this metaphysic is Incarnational paradox.  The paradox of the 
Incarnation is, in the final analysis, the paradox of the absolutisation of contingency – for 
Christ is the interface of absolute and contingent as the God-man.  Furthermore, the meeting 
of the temporal and the eternal in Christ leads to the recovery of reason, for reason is 
recovered in the betweenness or paradox of (incarnational) being, where finite belonging to 
the infinite is the order of things, where time meets eternity, absence meets presence, and 
immanence meets transcendence.75  In other words, reason is united to faith at the paradoxical 
interface of the universal (reason) and the particular (faith), which is the event of Christ.  This 
is why Milbank states that the absolutisation of contingency has a uniquely disclosive 
relationship to eternal truth, and is absolute truth – it is the paradoxical event of Christ which 
is truth.76 
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Given truth is the manifestation of divine being, it also communicates peace and the 
Good.  Indeed, love and truth are co-equal in God.77  So in Christ, the specifically exceptional 
in time where the divine being incorporating love and peace is disclosed, there is the 
establishment of the law of true human life (the law of love) against the old law which is the 
law of sin.  This is paradoxically based upon Christ as the exception to human law, and upon 
faith in the criminal death of the one who first identified himself as this exception.  Thus, 
only in the necessity of the paradoxical Incarnation and resurrection can truth and justice 
which undergird law be possible – that is, the law of love, which removes totalisation and 
intersubjective alienation, and loves the individual as different while also uniting them to the 
community.  Ultimately, Milbank argues, it is because of the Cross, the event of the judgment 
of God, that no return to the law of death, to the antique compromise of inhibition of 
violence, remains possible.78  Humanity can only be united through the arrival of Christ, the 
concrete event, beyond all laws – the arrival of fully restored human truth.79  Furthermore, 
with faith in this event necessarily comes charity, the advent of the love of God manifested in 
the Incarnation, crucifixion and resurrection, which to receive means to pass on as love for 
the neighbour.  Hence, in the final analysis, it is the Pauline law of love, to love your 
neighbour as yourself, which provides the foundation for a law that unites the individual to 
the community – a law of peace. 
 
To summarise and recapitulate in more precise terms, what has been so far established 
is this:  Milbank contends that the only alternative to a secular approach which sunders faith 
and reason is the return of a theology which is able to mediate between faith and reason, and 
unite them (and the same more broadly in terms of the particular and the universal).  This 
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theology arrives in the form of Incarnational paradox, where reason is recovered through faith 
in the truth of divine being, and this is revealed in Christ as the interface between the finite 
and the infinite, eternal God and temporal man.  In the disclosure of divine being as love and 
ontological peace through the incarnation, crucifixion and resurrection of Christ, the law of 
sin and death is replaced by a new law, the law of love, which can then become the 
theological truth which grounds law and consequently restores reason to faith, and removes 
the violence of alienation.80   
 
For in Christ peace is proleptically given, because only the perfect saving of one man 
from the absolute destruction of death through the resurrection of Christ, the refusal of the 
loss of any difference, can initially spell perfect and infinite peace leading to the institution of 
love.81  This is the normative dimension of the law of love: love is paradoxically both a 
commandment of the law and obedience to that commandment – love of God and of 
neighbour is commanded as the greatest commandment of the law by Christ, and Christ also 
says that if you love him you will obey his commandments.82  Thus, divine love both 
presupposes and is the necessary condition for obedience and the law, and is located in 
incarnational paradox.  This paradox of law and love also points the way to how the law of 
love may prove to be a foundation for modern codified law: it simultaneously fulfils the law 
by obeying the commandments since love does no wrong to a neighbour, and reflexively 
transcends the law by producing its own obedience.  This descriptive dimension of the law of 
love will be considered in the final section. 
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The Symbiosis of Law and Truth: Resurrection, the Law of Love and the Pauline 
Community 
 
Hence it seems, at least at the level of preliminary analysis, that there is a type of symbiotic 
relationship between law and truth.  For it is the law of love that presupposes the truth yielded 
through the Incarnational paradox and the resurrection, and this in turn provides the 
foundation in truth for the law to be instantiated, and in this way law and truth establish and 
maintain the other.  The resurrection in particular gains significance when considered in 
relation to how Milbank explains it in the Pauline context.  The first relevant theme in this 
regard is that Paul pursued law beyond law: the law of love, which is the basis for the 
expression of natural justice in symbolic law.83  Paul therefore linked natural justice with the 
invocation of a supreme divine king (Christ, the fulfilment of the law) who exceeded the law 
as embodying a living law, and he did so with particular regard to the resurrection.  This 
leads into the second theme, and returns us to the question of the law of love and its 
relationship to the resurrection, previously explained as an event yielding truth.  Justice lies 
before the law and is attainable through the truth of the resurrected man, for with death to the 
old law comes resurrection to a living law, the law of the spirit or the law of love which 
renews and redistributes the good.84  Thus, the determining factor in the symbiosis of law and 
truth, the reconciliation of reason and faith, and the removal of the violence of alienation of 
individual from community, is the event of the resurrection itself.  Paul’s own writings 
support this: 
Now if Christ is proclaimed as raised from the dead, how can some of you say that there is no 
resurrection of the dead?  But if there is no resurrection of the dead, then not even Christ has 
been raised.  And if Christ has not been raised, then our preaching is in vain and your faith is 
in vain. We are even found to be misrepresenting God, because we testified about God that he 
raised Christ, whom he did not raise if it is true that the dead are not raised.  For if the dead 
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are not raised, not even Christ has been raised.  And if Christ has not been raised, your faith is 
futile and you are still in your sins.85 
 
Paul makes it abundantly clear that the basis of the law of sin and death (as opposed 
to the law of love) being defeated is Christ himself actually being raised from the dead (it 
alone defeats death and brings life), for if Christ was not actually raised, Paul’s preaching is 
in vain and he is a false witness, faith is futile and sin is not dealt with, and most importantly 
since Christ has in fact been raised, he is the prototype and guarantee for the defeat of death 
and the general resurrection.86  As such, truth as participation in the divine is only revealed 
through the resurrection, giving the spirit of life rather than death.  In addition, hope is only 
given through Christ in the resurrection, and this itself is the basis for true peace.  Most 
importantly, since loving others requires loving God, and loving God involves trust or faith in 
God, and faith is futile without the resurrection, it follows that the law of love presupposes 
the truth revealed through faith in the entirety of the Christ-Event – life, death and 
resurrection.87   
 
What we therefore see is that from the perspective of Christian theology, the 
resurrection as truth and law is necessary for the proper operation of a reasonable faith and 
the law of love, and this allows the proposed symbiosis of law and truth to be more precisely 
articulated.  Truth is finally revealed through the paradox of the Incarnation, which is the 
meeting of the eternal and the temporal in Christ, his crucifixion, and his resurrection.  Since 
reason is recovered in this paradoxical revelation of the divine being as the law of love, in 
Christ reason and faith unite to yield truth, and provide a foundation for law which reconciles 
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the individual and the community.  In this disclosure of the divine being in Christ is revealed 
the love and peace inherent in Trinitarian relations, particularly the law of love which is the 
basis of the divine relationship.  Thus, the law of love in the divine being ultimately yields 
truth in the incarnational paradox.  The uniting and reconciliation of individual and 
communal humanity in Christ as the truth also leads to the passing of the law of love, which 
is obtained through the truth of the resurrected man and may now be given legal expression 
or codification as the civil law.  In this way, to reconcile the universal and the particular, civil 
law requires the law of love which is established by the truth of the Incarnational event.  
Similarly, the Incarnational event assumes the law of love since love is the ultimate 
foundation for the revelation and function of the mystery of divine Being and relationship.  In 
other words, law and truth operate symbiotically to establish and maintain the other. 
 
The proposition that truth is the moment of intersection between particular and 
universal, opened by the operation of the law, raises the question of what this may point 
towards.  With Milbank, it is proposed that truth as incarnational paradox is the interstitial 
space of sublation, simultaneously separating and connecting the fundamental parallel and so-
called ‘binaries’ of universal and particular, reason and faith, presence and absence, 
immanence and transcendence, self and other – the space where individual and community 
are reconciled through the operation of the law of the Trinity, or the law of love: the 
reconciliation of the one and the many, diversity in unity.  This is the crucial jurisprudential 
insight which the crude and popularised formulations of fideism and secularism miss, that 
God is both personal and wholly Other, the moment of simultaneous sameness and 
difference: the moment of truth.   
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Indeed, it is the resurrection of the personification of truth, Jesus Christ, which allows 
this insight.88  For it is Christ, the transcendent and the immanent, the one in whom divinity 
and humanity is united forever, who is the only mediator between God and man.89  So Christ, 
as the truth that mediates between universal and particular, also provides a new law.  Instead 
of the law of the letter which kills, it is a law of the Spirit, a law of love which gives life.90  In 
this sense, it is indeed the Trinitarian relationship and Christ as the revelation of that 
relationship which resolves the problem of the one and the many, or the problem of how to 
love the individual in the community.  True community is to be oneself but more than 
oneself, to be needed by the community, assimilated in the spirit.  This happens through love, 
not submission to a higher authority – according to Christ we love one another and each 
member of the community.91 
 
A Heavenly City 
 
All this ultimately begs the question of how the law of love may become the foundation of a 
new legal community.  At a holistic and visionary level, it is again Augustine who provides 
the key.  He argues that the eternal city, or the Christian community, possesses the heavenly 
peace by faith, and ‘lives a life of righteousness based on this faith, having the attainment of 
that peace in view in every good action it performs in relation to God, and in relation to a 
neighbour, since the life of a city is inevitably a social life’.92  In other words, this ideal 
heavenly peace is attainable on earth and refers to an ordered harmony in the community of 
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the city, where all citizens contribute and fulfil their role.93  As such, in the community the 
individual is not alienated and totalised, but loved by the community comprised of 
individuals as a function of the law of love, and performs their designated role as an act of 
love towards all other individuals comprising the community.   
 
As Milbank observes, this is because ‘the distinctiveness of Christianity, and its point 
of difference with antiquity and modernity, is its reconciliation of virtue with difference’.94  
The ethics of legal modernity are therefore not really ethical, because they are not oriented 
towards a harmonious, relational community as an end goal.  Instead, as we have seen, legal 
modernity (albeit inadvertently in many cases) celebrates control, force and violence over 
members.95  The division between the whole and the part perpetuates a fundamental 
discontinuity, where subordination of one by the other can only be by force.  In contrast, 
Christian ontology abolishes this division and duality which supports the notion of an 
ineradicable ontological violence.96  Christianity is therefore something like the peaceful 
transmission of difference, or differences in a continuous harmony.97  The ultimate 
consummation of this community of differences in perfect peace and love, then, is heaven.  
This vision of heaven (or for Augustine, the City of God) consequently allows the denial of 
the necessity of violence, and exposes the manner in which the assumption of an always-prior 
violence preserves violence.  Furthermore, it indicates that there is a way to act in a violent 
world which assumes the ontological priority of non-violence, and this way is called 
forgiveness of sins, brought through the Incarnation and loving sacrifice of Christ.  Such 
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action alone can preserve a peaceful, loving community – the Christian community, and, by 
implication, the legal community.98   
 
Therefore, the promotion of the liberal legal subject, with their autonomy and reason, 
has ultimately failed, for this alienates the members of the universal community in favour of 
privileging the individual, which leads to violence. Indeed, secular reason appropriated this 
arbitrary element and pervaded law by engendering a newly rationalistic and formalised 
approach, one which resulted in pure possession and control, and in the regulation and 
balancing of power.  This in turn led to liberal conceptions of property rights, a doctrine of 
unlimited sovereignty, and relationships between legal bodies (both persons and 
corporations) being conceived on a contractualist basis.99  Such is at fundamental odds with 
the Christian vision of loving one’s neighbour personally rather than as an abstract legal 
entity.  However, the alternative vision of the pure ‘common good’ alienates the individual in 
favour of privileging the community, similarly resulting in violence.  Consequently, what is 
seemingly required is not simply the positing of a secularised and impotent ‘law of love’ in 
the modern liberal-positivist legal system, nor merely ad hoc adjustments according to the 
law of the letter (i.e. the passing, amending and repealing of legislation or the steady 
progression of the common law) which are already built on this violent foundation, but a 
complete restoration, a rebuilding on the new foundation of the theological law to love one’s 
neighbour as yourself to reinvigorate the legal system, a law of the spirit which will reconcile 
the individual and the community, allowing all persons, particular and universal, to exist in a 
legal ontology of harmony and peace. 
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Repairing the Broken Middle: Rose on Milbank and Legal Violence 
 
However, Milbank’s argument here has not gone without criticism, particularly from the late 
Gillian Rose.  Milbank acknowledges both that Rose is fundamental to his work, and that she 
has also disagreed with it.100  Rose’s desire to ‘retrieve and rediscover’ a tradition of law that 
the ‘post-structuralist wave’ has ‘overcome’, particularly through her review of Nietzsche, 
Foucault and Derrida, provides an important foundation for Milbank’s theologically parallel 
work in Theology and Social Theory.101  Both Milbank and Rose contend that modernism has 
gone awry and that post-structuralist nihilism is no solution.102  Although Rose is initially 
concerned with law in the context of nihilism and deconstruction, she also importantly 
identifies that there is a tension that exists in law involving the universal and the particular, 
namely that ‘the other, unknowable, law… is precisely… the law of the person’.103  The 
formal law is necessary to our self-consciousness and utterly intimate, yet we have no 
acquaintance with it and it is entirely remote.  We obey it only because of its ‘universal 
practical validity’.104  This is particularly manifested through what Rose calls the ‘antinomy 
of law’, or the ‘inscrutable encounter with form in general’.105  Rose expands this idea to 
mean the ‘dual implication of law and ethics’ in The Broken Middle, and states that where 
Dialectic of Nihilism argues that ‘post-structuralist nihilism completes itself as law – 
unreflected but always historically identifiable’ – here ‘post-modern antinomianism 
completes itself as political theology, as new ecclesiology, mending the diremption of law 
and ethics’.106 
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It is at this point where Rose and Milbank part ways: their conception of the necessity 
of violence in law.  Rose argues that the notion of love without violence is a ‘sect mentality’ 
which becomes ‘the only refuge for humankind’s invincible enslavement to violence’ – it 
displays a ‘lack of faith in the violence to be found in love, the love to be found in violence – 
the law to be found in both’.107  Fundamentally, contrary to Milbank, violence is ‘not being 
posited as prior to law: it is presupposed as the call of law’.108  Rose specifically engages 
Milbank on this point.109  She argues that Milbank’s conception of a heavenly city of peace 
‘effectively destroys the idea of a city: its task of salvation deprives it of site; while its 
inclusive appeal deprives it of limit or boundary that would mark it off from any other city 
and their different laws’.110  It is, as Milbank admits, ‘a paradox, a nomad city’.111  Milbank 
would even see these attributes as virtues; the heavenly city has no alienating and dividing 
(violent) boundaries, and as an eternal community has no specific site – though it can be 
arguably instantiated on earth so it is situated to some extent.  The disputed issue therefore 
seems to be the ethereality of Milbank’s city, its lack of basis in the reality of socio-legal 
relations due to its salvific escapism and lack of concrete definition. 
 
In particular, Rose claims that we should not embrace either the Athenian tradition of 
the Greeks, which takes the existing law as transcendent and beyond critique, or the Jewish 
tradition which opposes the law of the city to revelation, which then becomes a law which is 
transcendent and beyond critical evaluation.  We should instead take a middle path which 
engages critically with both extremes, and this path is the true realm of law.  For the middle is 
always broken; legal institutions always do some harm, and we should not attempt to either 
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accept it or escape it.112  True faith is to grapple with this difficulty of the broken or violent 
middle.113  Rose understands faith in this context as being (existing) in the midst of 
uncertainties and mysteries without grasping for facts and reason, in conjunction with the 
enlarging of inhibited practical reason.114  Faith is not about any object in particular (it is not 
a faith ‘in’ God as Milbank might have it), but rather an inflection or attitude of being and 
action in the world.115  So the middle is the realm of the necessarily violent law, and to 
simply accept it and mask it without critique (as liberalism does) or escape it without a 
struggling engagement (with Milbank’s heavenly city) is to lack faith and actually reinscribe 
this violence.116   
 
Rose ultimately contends that ‘mended middles betray their broken middle’, 
presenting a ‘holy middle’ which ultimately ‘corrupts’ because it claims to repair the relation 
between the universal and particular, ‘drawing attention away from the reconfiguration of 
singular, individual and state’.117  The middle is always ‘broken – because these institutions 
are systemically flawed’ – and this implies that ‘this holiness will itself be reconfigured by 
the resource and articulation of modern domination’.118  In other words, Milbank’s (false) 
claim of a perfectly peaceful city with a holy relation between individual and state will be 
utilised to perpetrate even greater violence.119  ‘If the broken middle is abandoned instead of 
thought systematically, then the resulting evasive theology, insinuated epistemology, 
sacralised polity, will import the features of the City of Death remorselessly’.120  In short, the 
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telos of their critical projects differ; Milbank concludes with a vision of ontological peace, 
while Rose calls us to be content with the struggle within the world we have.121   
 
Importantly, Vincent Lloyd argues that for Rose, law can be identified with social 
norms, and since violence is always implicated in law, this implies that social norms never 
completely match with social practice.  This is why Rose is so opposed to any theory which 
may suggest that a (legal) authority is beyond question – it will result in the violence of 
unwarranted and unjustified penalties.122  That is a formidable objection given Milbank’s 
emphasis on the ultimate or heavenly social peace, which presumably is beyond question 
because for Milbank it represents the culmination of social ontology.  However, it is arguably 
not an insurmountable one in the sense of considering the possibility that social norms could 
match with social practice.  If this occurred, it seems that the broken middle would be 
repaired, and there would no longer be an inevitable violence of law.  This may exist in the 
idea of the law of love itself.  As discussed above, it is a unique norm in the sense that it is a 
command which may govern human society, but one which can also be seen as a practice – 
loving one’s neighbour as yourself.   It therefore appears that in this framework there is scope 
for social norm(s) and social practice to match, repairing the middle and removing the 
invincibility of violence.  With Rose, we can continue evaluating and interrogating the extent 
to which these do in fact coalesce, but this does not exclude the possibility of their doing so. 
 
Even Rose seems to acknowledge this to some extent according to Lloyd, since to 
love is an act of faith, the suspension of usual relational norms; love relationships do not have 
the usual normative quality, and do not have any mechanisms of protection.123  Rose relays 
                                                            
121 Lloyd (2007), p 697. 
122 Lloyd (2008), p 686. 
123 Lloyd (2008), pp 701-702. 
34 
 
the story of Abraham’s (near) sacrifice of Isaac as acknowledging the love in violence and 
the violence in love, with the law being in both.  She goes on to say that it is this ‘free 
offering’, this ‘already knowing yet being willing to stake oneself again’ that ‘prevents one… 
from acting with arbitrary violence’.124  It seems that such an idea culminates in the willing 
sacrifice of Christ, the ultimate act of faith through suffering of violence which implies that 
we too can choose in faith not to engage in violence.  Like Christ, we may be called upon to 
suffer violence when norms do not match practice, but because of his resurrection we can – 
and we can also consequently continue a community of love and peace.125  So in one sense 
Rose’s insight is absolutely true; violence is inevitable because Christ always has to suffer.  
But it is in this very act of violent love, or the paradoxically violent resistance of violence, 
that the law of love is instituted, and norms can match practice: the possibility for peace 
remains. 
 
A Vision of True Peace: Law of Love as the Grundnorm 
 
These normative and descriptive (practice) elements of the law of love as potentially 
providing the foundation for a regenerated civil law and the creation of a community of peace 
can be articulated through the prism of Hans Kelsen’s Grundnorm, or basic norm.  For 
Kelsen, the idea of the basic norm is a presupposed, fundamental norm that authorises and 
founds any coherent and valid legal system.  It gives meaning to a legal system and bestows 
the legal power to create such a system.126  At one level, some may note the apparent 
absurdity of using Kelsen, the high positivist, as a model for how a theological truth such as 
the law of love may found the civil law – particularly bearing in mind the rather severe 
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125 See Milbank (2003), pp 70, 100, 102-103. 
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criticisms of positivism contained in this article.  However, Kelsen himself notes that the law 
of love is an example of the basic norm, illustrating that the neighbour principle contains 
content from which other norms can be logically deduced, resulting in the establishment of an 
entire system of valid norms.127  Given that Kelsen can observe the fact that the law of love is 
an example of the basic norm, it seems theology also should be able to begin implementing 
such a process.   
 
The most powerful example of how this may work is found in Romans 13:8-10.  In 
this passage immediately following Paul’s injunction to render obedience to the civil 
authorities, he clarifies this by stating that this should be achieved by loving one another, for 
love fulfils the law.  He proceeds to show that the commandments are all summed up by the 
law of love: to love your neighbour as yourself.  Thus, Paul is arguing that in addition to the 
reasons given in Romans 13:1-7, the civil authorities should be obeyed as a function of the 
law of love.  Furthermore, the law of love legitimises and validates the commandment system 
in conjunction with the civil authorities, for Paul uses it to justify his instruction to obey them 
by stating that this law of love fulfils obedience.  It is the law of love that vindicates and 
gives meaning to the civil authorities and the series of commandments by ultimately 
transcending and fulfilling them.  Paul also demonstrates that the law of love provides the 
content from which an entire system of valid norms can be logically deduced.  In Romans 
13:10, he states that love does no wrong to a neighbour.  In this way, all the commandments 
such as not to murder and steal and the like are contained by this principle, since if you love 
your neighbour according to Paul you will not murder them or steal from them.  Therefore, 
the axiom to love your neighbour as yourself can plausibly provide the content of ‘doing no 
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wrong to a neighbour’ from which a series of norms can be promulgated and a harmonious 
legal community which loves the individual can be created. 
 
This ‘new creation’ of the law from its very spirit can arguably lead to a peace beyond 
violence, and a law beyond force, for instead the law of love, of selfless sacrifice and the 
pursuit of peace, will inhere in the interactions of individual persons, constituting a comm-
unity of peace modelled on the relations between the members of the Tri-Unity, graciously 
revealed in Christ.  In a specifically judicial context, this implies that it is more important to 
investigate than to punish, for once the offence is discovered, the aim is always to restore the 
offender and promote reconciliation and redemption.128  Here, the practice of forgiveness 
nevertheless involves a practice of restitution, because forgiveness is a gratuitous self-
offering beyond the demands of the secular law.  Christ is the ultimate model for this, since 
he offered himself for forgiveness of sins when he was under no legal obligation to do so.  
Hence, wrongs must be put right by rectification and restoration, or if this is not possible, 
some other means which demonstrates a will to harmony among human beings.129  It seems 
that the argument of the Apostle Paul in Romans 13:8-10 that the law of love fulfils the law 
since love does no wrong to a neighbour can plausibly be extended to all areas of law, such 
that a Christian theology of peace can be translated into a legal ontology of peace.  
 
Ultimately, it is this vision which Christianity seeks – not to escape from society as 
Rose contends, but to redeem it – to bring the heavenly peace of community and love to earth 
in the context of what may effectively become a post-secular system of civil law.  This law of 
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love exists in its perfect display within the relations of the Trinity, and is revealed as truth 
through Christ, who reconciles the universal and the particular, rescuing reason from its 
secular, violent form and producing an ontology of vertical and horizontal peace between 
God and humanity respectively.  Persuaded by this vision, humanity participates in the 
glorious divine, implementing the law of the Spirit to love one’s neighbour, rather than the 
law of the letter, thus creating a harmonious legal community which reflects the heavenly 
relations.  It is hoped this article will indicate that society ought not to yield to an ontology of 
violence and alienation, but may instead embrace ontological peace, which loves all 
individuals in the community and allows the reconciliation of virtue and difference based on 
the Trinity.  If pursued, the Christian vision of an ontology of peace undergirding human and 
divine relations can not only be a heavenly vision, but an earthly fulfilment as well. 
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